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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 18-2087 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
HECTOR CISNEROS-IBARRA, 
a/k/a Hector Ibarra Cisneros 
 
Hector Cisneros-Ibarra, 
       Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-16-cr-00362-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 16, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 8, 2019) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
This sentencing appeal arises out of Hector Cisneros-Ibarra’s fourth conviction for 
unlawful reentry.  In addition to his many offenses for illegal border-crossings, Cisneros-
Ibarra has accrued four state convictions for DUI and three convictions for cocaine 
trafficking.  In this case, once he pled guilty to his fourth unlawful reentry, his Guidelines 
range was 24 to 30 months in prison.   
In the request at the center of this appeal, Cisneros-Ibarra asked the District Court 
for a lighter sentence on the ground that he was ineligible for certain prison rehabilitation 
programs as a removable alien.  From the bench, the Court noted that it had “to consider 
the need to provide him with educational and vocational training and other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.”  App. 81.  As a result, it stated it would 
“recommend to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons that he be afforded drug counseling and any 
educational and vocational training programs they could make available to him.”  Id.  It 
ultimately sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment, the top end of the Guidelines 
range.  Cisneros-Ibarra has appealed on the ground that the Court failed to consider his 
argument about his inability to participate in rehabilitation programs.1 
Because Cisneros-Ibarra failed to object to the sentence at the time, we review his 
challenge now for plain error.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 
2014) (en banc).  Thus he must show that (1) the Court erred, (2) the error was obvious, 
(3) it affected substantial rights, and (4) it affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
                                              
1  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
per 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 3 
 
reputation of the judiciary.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997); United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).  Taking each item in turn, we will affirm the 
District Court. 
First, the Court did not err in its treatment of rehabilitation at Cisneros-Ibarra’s 
sentencing.  A sentencing court must give “an explanation . . . sufficient for us to see that 
the particular circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration.”  
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).  Faced with Cisneros-
Ibarra’s argument that he could not participate in certain rehabilitation programs, the 
Court stated that it would “recommend to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons that he be afforded 
drug counseling and any educational and vocational training programs they could make 
available to him.”  App. 81.  This was consistent with the rule that “[a] sentencing court 
can recommend that the BOP place an offender in a particular . . . [rehabilitative] 
program.”  Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (emphasis deleted); see also 
id. at 334 (“A court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation 
within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.”).  And even 
though Cisneros-Ibarra is ineligible for some rehabilitative programs, he still may 
participate in, for example, the Parenting Program, the Drug Abuse Education Program, 
and the English-as-a-Second Language Program. 
Second, as the District Court is not required to consider Cisneros-Ibarra’s inability 
to avail himself of certain rehabilitation programs, there can be no obvious error.  
“[W]hen sentencing an offender to prison, the court shall consider all the purposes of 
punishment except rehabilitation — because imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
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pursuing that goal.”  Id. at 328.  Cisneros-Ibarra argues that this rule prohibits a district 
court only from increasing a sentence primarily in order to rehabilitate the defendant, not 
from decreasing the sentence due to unavailability of rehabilitation.  But the 
permissibility of decreasing a sentence due to rehabilitation is still an open question, see 
id. at 329 n.5, so the District Court did not obviously err in failing to lighten Cisneros-
Ibarra’s sentence on this basis. 
Third, any error by the District Court did not affect Cisneros-Ibarra’s substantial 
rights.  Put differently, there is not a reasonable probability that the Court would have 
changed its sentence had it better considered Cisneros-Ibarra’s argument about 
rehabilitation.  It discussed at length his demonstrated lack of respect for the rule of law 
and the need to deter future lawbreaking.  Given his extensive record — four convictions 
for unlawful reentry, four state convictions for DUI, and three convictions for drug 
trafficking — a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range was warranted.   
Fourth, for the same reason, affirming this 30-month sentence would not threaten 
the fairness or integrity of the judiciary.   
Thus we affirm. 
 
